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1Introduction
Michael P. Dooley and Jeﬀrey A. Frankel
The management of financial crises in emerging markets is a high-stakes
and contentious problem for public policy. Policy interventions must be im-
plemented quickly and under the worst possible economic circumstances.
After the dust settles it is diﬃcult to construct a convincing counterfactual
in order to evaluate alternative policies.
An example, addressed directly by the first two chapters in this volume, is
the debate over the proper use of interest rates to limit exchange rate depre-
ciation in the midst of a crisis. Senior oﬃcials of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have taken diﬀerent sides in this de-
bate, even though these institutions have not been well known for allowing
internal debate to spill into the public press in the past. This public contro-
versy underscores the importance of the issues involved and the depth of the
uncertainty within the economics profession concerning the nature of good
policy in this area. These problems are not solving themselves. As the pa-
pers in this volume were being written, further crises were brewing in Tur-
key, Argentina, and perhaps elsewhere, and the hot debate about the role of
the official sector has intensified.
The papers collected in this volume were presented at a conference in
March 2001. The main purpose was to bring together a group of academ-
ics, oﬃcials in the multilateral organizations, and public- and private-sector
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economists to discuss issues related to the management of financial crisis in
the emerging market countries. (A companion conference produced the
volume Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, edited by Sebast-
ian Edwards and Jeﬀrey Frankel.) In commissioning a series of original pa-
pers, the editors and Martin Feldstein, the originator of the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research’s project on Exchange Rate Crises in Emerging
Markets, called on economists who have contributed to the academic liter-
ature and, in many cases, have participated in the policy process.
The volume is divided into three parts, which can be viewed almost
chronologically, as three phases counting forward from the moment that a
country is hit by a crisis: first, the initial attempt to defend the currency; sec-
ond, the IMF rescue program; and, third, the impact of the crisis and res-
cue program on the real economy. The first three chapters focus on the im-
mediate defense of the regime under attack. The important issue here is
whether unnecessary damage to economies can be avoided by the right re-
sponse in the first few hours and days of a financial crisis. The next five
chapters examine the adjustment programs that follow crises. It is now clear
that crises have long-lasting negative eﬀects on economic growth. Adjust-
ment programs supported by financial assistance are designed to shorten
the recovery phase and minimize the probability of further diﬃculties. Fi-
nally, the third group of four papers provides empirical evaluation of ad-
justment programs. Do they accomplish what they are designed to accom-
plish? Do they impose disproportionate costs on the poorest members of
society?
It would be nice to believe that these diﬃcult questions are resolved in the
pages that follow. That goal is surely unrealistic. However, we hope that
scholars and policy makers will find the work presented useful in thinking
about how to reduce the frequency and costs of financial crises in the years
to come.
The Defense
In “Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in the Korean, Philippine, and
Thai Exchange Rate Crises,” Dongchul Cho and Kenneth D. West consider
the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates immediately af-
ter the onset of a crisis. They propose a two-equation model for exchange
rates and interest rates: a monetary policy reaction function, with the in-
terest rate as the instrument, and an interest parity equation. The important
identifying assumption is that the currency risk premium depends on the
level of interest rates. The eﬀects of interest rates on exchange rates are am-
biguous because increases in interest rates can increase a risk premium.
Cho and West estimate a special case of the model using weekly data from
1997 and 1998 for Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Their results sug-
gest that increases in interest rates following crises led to exchange rate ap-
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preciation in Korea and the Philippines but to depreciation in Thailand.
Confidence intervals around point estimates are very large, however, and
they cannot rule out the possibility that the sign of the actual eﬀect is the
opposite of the one estimated.
Alan Drazen’s chapter, “Interest Rate Defense Against Speculative At-
tack as a Signal: A Primer,” also deals with an interest rate defense against
a speculative attack. He argues that high interest rates per se are unlikely to
deter speculators when a discreet devaluation is likely. However, an interest
rate defense might nevertheless succeed if high interest rates are a signal of
the government’s willingness or ability to defend the exchange rate. Drazen
explores a class of models in which an interest rate defense alters the spec-
ulators’ views of the type of government they face. In other words, this
model allows for building credibility. The interest rate increase allows the
government to distinguish itself from other governments that would not de-
fend. This model presumes that the only available strategy for supporting a
peg is an interest rate defense; if, instead, central banks can also run down
or borrow reserves, the high interest rate defense may signal low reserves
and hence encourage speculation. Drazen argues that empirical work sup-
ports both possibilities.
In “Does It Pay to Defend Against a Speculative Attack?” Barry Eichen-
green and Andrew K. Rose compare the behavior of failed and successful
defenses of currency pegs. They show that the costs of unsuccessfully de-
fending against an attack are large. They are equivalent to approximately
one year of economic growth: 3 percentage points of GNP in the year im-
mediately following a crisis and roughly half that amount in the succeed-
ing year. These losses are only evident for short periods. This finding helps
to account for a number of observations about the behavior of open
economies and their policy makers. Authorities have good reasons for de-
fending currency pegs. International organizations tend to provide gener-
ous financial assistance to countries seeking to defend their currencies
against attack. Finally, it appears that the V-shaped pattern of recovery
from the Asian crisis is quite general—it is the prototypical response of out-
put to a successful attack. These results are robust to the following sensi-
tivity checks: (a) how tranquil versus crisis periods are defined; (b) inclusion
of capital control variables; (c) addition of financial variables, or external
sustainability variables (like foreign exchange reserves to debt, etc.); (d) ex-
clusion of high inflation countries; and (e) exclusion of OECD countries.
The Program
In “The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large
Enough?” Olivier Jeanne and Charles Wyplosz explore the idea that an in-
ternational lender of last resort would be a useful addition to the interna-
tional financial architecture. Could an international lender of last resort
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(ILOLR) function eﬀectively as a fund with limited and predetermined re-
sources? If so, how much resources would it need? Using a model of an
emerging economy that is vulnerable to international liquidity crises, the
authors find that the required size of the ILOLR depends on how its re-
sources are used by the domestic authorities. If the ILOLR resources are
used to finance foreign exchange intervention by the domestic central bank,
the bad equilibrium is not removed, even by an arbitrarily large LOLR. If,
in contrast, the LOLR backs a guarantee of the foreign currency liabilities
of domestic banks, its resources do not need to be larger than the liquidity
gap in the domestic banking sector.
In “Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises,” Michael P.
Dooley and Sujata Verma take on several issues. The first is analyzing the
role of the IMF in a game theoretic context. The key assumption is that
creditors cannot distinguish between nonpayment for liquidity reasons (liq-
uidity defaults) and strategic defaults. In this environment, it may be opti-
mal for creditors to precommit to imposing losses on the debtors by delib-
erately making the contracts diﬃcult to renegotiate (this entails “excess
sanctions” from a first best perspective). In this framework the IMF can
have a role by facilitating negotiations so that the proceeds from the assets
can still be shared following default. The IMF can also serve a welfare-
improving role if it possesses more information than the creditor does about
the state of nature facing the debtor.
A second major issue that is explored is why there are large output losses
postcrisis. Most first-generation models of currency crises do not predict
output losses. Second-generation (multiple-equilibrium) models might pre-
dict large output losses; and, in most such models, adding liquidity (in-
creasing the size of the rescue packages) will reduce the output losses asso-
ciated with crises. The explanation forwarded is an extension of Dooley’s
“insurance model.” Capital inflows are “insured” by governments. The ex-
tent of the inflow is a function of the amount of insurance available—re-
serves, liquid assets of the government, credit lines from other governments
and international institutions. Hence, in this framework, a crisis is the ex-
change of assets between the government and private investors. It is diﬀer-
entiated from a default by the fact that, in an uncertain world, guesses about
the extent of insurance may be too high. In this case the country must de-
fault, and real resources will have to be transferred. A corollary of this is
that the default durations will be linked to the size of the rescue packages.
The authors provide some empirical evidence suggesting that output losses
(a proxy for default durations) are indeed correlated with ex post rescue
packages.
In “Financial Restructuring in Banking and Corporate-Sector Crises:
What Policies to Pursue?” Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc
Laeven examine a micro dataset for 700 companies in nine crisis countries
with the objective of identifying what policies are important in minimizing
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the costs of the crises. They find that liquidity support early in the crisis and
the use of a government-run asset management corporation (AMC) can
mitigate the severity of a financial crisis. On the other hand, government
guarantees of the banking system’s financial liabilities do not appear to be
helpful. Finally, the extent and quality of the legal framework are critical
factors in determining whether the financial system’s recovery from a fi-
nancial shock is sustained and durable.
In “On the Fiscal Implications of Twin Crises,” A. Craig Burnside, Mar-
tin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo explore the implications of diﬀerent
strategies for financing the fiscal costs of twin crises for rates of inflation and
currency depreciation. They use a first-generation-type model of specula-
tive attacks that has four key features: (a) the crisis is triggered by prospec-
tive deficits; (b) there exists outstanding nonindexed government debt is-
sued prior to the crises; (c) a portion of the government’s liabilities is not
indexed to inflation; and (d) there are nontradable goods and costs of dis-
tributing tradable goods, so that purchasing power parity does not hold.
The model can account for the high rates of devaluation and moderate rates
of inflation often observed in the wake of currency crises. Their analysis
suggests that the Mexican government is likely to pay for the bulk of the fis-
cal costs of its crisis through seigniorage revenues. In contrast, the Korean
government is likely to rely more on a combination of implicit and explicit
fiscal reforms.
In “An Evaluation of Proposals to Reform the International Financial
Architecture,” Morris Goldstein provides an assessment of some of the
leading reform proposals. He uses lending policies and practices of the IMF
as an organizing device for discussing selected issues in the reform debate,
namely, interest rate increases and reduction of IMF loan maturity, the size
of IMF packages, and issues of conditionality. The paper emphasizes the
importance of currency mismatches and argues that most of the antidotes
for currency mismatching problems proposed so far appear to be either too
costly or too drastic. Instead of such antidotes, the paper favors a combi-
nation of managed floating and active development of hedging mecha-
nisms. Furthermore, it suggests that every request for an IMF program
should contain data on existing currency mismatching by the banking and
corporate sectors, analysis of the sustainability of these mismatches, and ex-
plicit conditions for reducing the mismatch.
The Impact
In “Recovery and Sustainability in East Asia,” Yung Chul Park and Jong-
Wha Lee analyze macroeconomic adjustment following the crisis in East
Asia from a broad international perspective. The stylized pattern that
emerges from the previous 160 currency crisis episodes shows a V-type ad-
justment of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the years prior to
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and following a crisis. The adjustment shows a much sharper V-type ad-
justment in the crisis episodes with an IMF program, compared to those
without. Cross-country regressions show that depreciation of real exchange
rate, expansionary macroeconomic policies, and favorable global environ-
ments are critical for the speedy postcrisis recovery. In this sense, the East
Asian process of adjustment is not much diﬀerent from the previous cur-
rency crisis episodes.
However, the degree of initial contraction and following recovery has
been far greater in East Asia than what the cross-country evidence predicts.
This paper attributes the sharper adjustment pattern in East Asia to the se-
vere liquidity crisis that was triggered by investors’ panic and then ampli-
fied by the weak corporate and bank balance sheets. They find no evidence
for a direct impact of currency crises on long-run growth.
In “A Cure Worse Than The Disease? Currency Crises and the Output
Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs,” Michael M. Hutchison
concludes that participation in an IMF program is associated with a 0.75
percentage point reduction in GDP growth. He notes, however, that the
growth slowdown usually precedes participation in an IMF program, sug-
gesting that the relationship might not be causal. On the one hand, partici-
pation in an IMF-supported program following a balance-of-payments or
currency crisis does not appear to mitigate the output loss associated with
such events. On the other hand, Malaysia—the one crisis country in the
East Asian episode that did not have an IMF program—suﬀered more than
those countries with programs. Countries participating in IMF programs
significantly reduce domestic credit growth, while no eﬀect is found on
budget policy. Applying this model to the collapse of output in East Asia
following the 1997 crisis, the author finds that the unexpected (forecast er-
ror) collapse of output in Malaysia—where an IMF program was not fol-
lowed—was somewhat larger on average than in those countries adopting
IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand).
In “IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Pov-
erty,” William Easterly argues that structural adjustment, as measured
by the number of adjustment loans from the IMF and World Bank, reduces
the sensitivity of poverty reduction to the rate of growth. Growth does re-
duce poverty, but he finds no evidence for a direct eﬀect of structural ad-
justment on the average rate of growth. Instead, the poor benefit less from
output expansion in countries with many adjustment loans than in coun-
tries with few. By the same token, the poor suﬀer less from an output con-
traction in countries with many adjustment loans than in countries with few
adjustment loans. Why would this be? One hypothesis is that adjustment
lending is countercyclical in ways that smooth consumption for the poor.
There is evidence that some policy variables under adjustment lending are
countercyclical, but there is no evidence that the cyclical component of
those policy variables aﬀects poverty. He speculates that the poor may be ill
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placed to take advantage of new opportunities created by structural adjust-
ment reforms, just as they may suﬀer less from the loss of old opportunities
in sectors that were artificially protected prior to reforms.
In “Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price Changes and the
Poor,” James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed Friedman provide early es-
timates of the impact of the July 1997 Indonesian economic crisis on In-
donesia’s poor. They find that price increases have aﬀected the cost of liv-
ing of poor households disproportionally. Just how hard the poor have been
hit, however, depends on where the household lives, on whether the house-
hold is in an urban or rural area, and on just how the cost of living is com-
puted. What is clear is that the notion that the very poor are so poor as to
be insulated from international shocks is simply wrong. Rather, in the In-
donesian case, the poor appear the most vulnerable.
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